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一、讲座主题:Optimal Selling Mechanism with Continuous Buyer Search: A Perverse Effect


二、主讲人:刘东日,新加坡国立大学经济学博士,研究方向微观经济理论


三、主要内容:We adopt a dynamic mechanism design approach to study how a revenue-maximizing seller should sell an indivisible object, when a potential buyer privately endowed with his value can conduct a hidden search with an arbitrary intensity for an outside option. Our optimal selling mechanism generalizes that of Armstrong and Zhou (2016) who assume buyer search is a binary decision. We find that continuous search requires an optimal non-refundable deposit that must depend on the buyer's search cost function, though it is independent of the search cost for binary search. Moreover, contrast to binary search, continuous search entails a perverse effect: less costly buyer search might enhance seller revenue.


四、时间:2022年9月15日12:00-13:00


五、地点:腾讯会议740-722-851 密码:0915

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